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RACHAEL PECKHAM
We were deprived first of our community, then . . . of our
names.
—Elie Wiesel, “A Special Presentation:
Oprah and Elie Wiesel at the Auschwitz
Death Camp”
tell me your names
tell me your bashful names
and i will testify
—Lucille Clifton, “at the cemetery,
walnut grove plantation, south carolina,
1989”
Occasionally while I’m writing, I will experience a truly fortuitous
moment, “a happening” that moves beyond mere coincidence and into the
realm of what Freud calls the uncanny. Tonight, I turned on the television
and before the pixels could even form an image, a soft incantation filled the
room: We speak your names / We speak your names / We speak your names.
For a second the chant had the ring and tone of a mythical, cloud-parting
message from above—but just as quickly, the televised picture appeared
and it was not God at all, but Oprah Winfrey delivering the words (an
implication I suspect she wouldn’t mind; she is, after all, a pop-cultural
goddess, the deity of daytime talk). Nonetheless, the repeated words—lines
from Pearl Cleage’s poem, “We Speak Your Names”1—are intended to have
an awesome effect on the listener; they evoke what Debra Walker King calls
the power “to perform magic, to call forth an entity or influence a way of
being in the world.” In her book, Deep Talk: Reading African-American
Identity Anxiety and the Power and Problem
of Naming in African American and Jewish
American Literature
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Literary Names, King writes, “The magic of naming speaks into being the
resistant and constantly re-creative power of onomastic deep talk” (King 3).
Putting aside King’s notion of “deep talk” for a moment, this power to
call things into being is an idea we often witness in sacred texts (John’s
gospel starts, In the beginning was the Word . . .) as well as in certain
theoretical treatises (in particular, Heidegger’s argument that “Language
speaks [us]”). As language names, it creates. But the reverse is also true:
names are language. That is, name can be either a noun or a verb—two parts
of language that determine a subject or an object; the one performing the
action or the one being acted upon, respectively. Said another way,
“Language—that fundamental act of organizing the mind’s encounter with
an experienced world—is propelled by a rhythm of naming: it is the means
by which the mind takes possession of the named, at once fixing the named
as irreversibly Other” (Benston 3).
This is all heady talk for the simple groundwork I want to lay regarding
the power of names and naming. And where there is power, there is
potential for problems—specifically, in the ways identity gets played out,
especially “cultural identity” in post-slavery and post-Holocaust writing
and the intercultural contact that marks these histories. In such narratives,
names function as sites of identity anxiety, as they are never fixed, but rather
in constant tension with the authors’ and/or the characters’ fraught
experiences. Thus, names not only have power—they have “re-creative
power,” as King suggests, that speaks to an ever-changing identity, or
“condition of the spirit” (3).
This argument finds its footing in scholarship such as Stuart Hall’s
“Cultural Identity and Diaspora,” in which he writes of “identity as a
‘production’ which is never complete, always in process, and always
constituted within, not outside, representation” (392, emphasis mine). Hall
sees this representation-within as a position from which “we all write and
speak,” reminding us that “what we say is always in ‘context,’ positioned . . .
[in] a particular time and place and a culture which is specific.” But this
positioning is not a stationary one; rather, cultural identity is in motion
along two axes, as he sees it: first, along the vector of similarity (e.g., a
collective consciousness, as in, “the black experience”); and secondly, the
vector of difference (those “ruptures and discontinuities” that determine
“the Carribbean’s ‘uniqueness’”), making names both individual and
collective (395). Both axes, then, are needed to fully frame my own
exploration (yet another fraught word) of the representation of names in
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African American and Jewish American literature, with special
consideration of how the authors’ and/or characters’ acts of naming, un-
naming, and re-naming all signal a fluid cultural and racial identity, “subject
to the continuous ‘play’ of history, culture and power” (392).2
I apply this argument namely to The Autobiography of Malcolm X;
Ralph Ellison’s personal essay, “Hidden Name and Complex Fate”; and
Bernard Malamud’s short story, “The Lady of the Lake”—keeping in mind
that each genre brings its own set of concerns to the discussion. Presumably,
fiction writers yield a certain license in deciding their characters’ names,
while nonfiction writers are held to an ethical expectation that what they
write is “true”—whatever that means to a particular time and place and a
culture. Already plenty of counter-examples come to mind; for one, there
are times when anonymity trumps fact, as when nonfiction writers seek to
protect the identities of those they (re)name, and does so by acknowledging
that such a change has been made, either parenthetically or in a footnote.
But for the sake of this discussion, I’ll leave it at this, echoing Hall once
more: while the names in fiction are seemingly the author’s construction,
they too exist “within, not outside, representation” (392); they too signify a
positioning of identity—an identity no less unstable than the author’s own,
who harnesses the power, and thereby the problem, to name. 
In my opinion, the writer’s purposeful picking of a name warrants an
even more purposeful study of it. “We should not, for a moment,” Hall
warns, “underestimate or neglect the importance of the act of imaginative
rediscovery. . . .” Indeed, naming is arguably the most important speech act
that writers perform in the re-imagining of identity, on account of the
troubled relationship naming bears to meaning-making, even—perhaps,
especially—when experience, named or otherwise, defies all attempts at
meaning-making (as is often the critique of art after Auschwitz). Such “re-
tellings,” Hall suggests, “offer a way of imposing an imaginary coherence
on the experience of dispersal and fragmentation, which is the history of all
enforced diasporas” (392) and forms the “context” for the African American
and Jewish American literature discussed here.3 This context is fraught with
contradiction, staked on “the broken rubric of our past” (395)—the
precarious location for these two groups’struggle to know themselves
within nomenclatures that are at odds with this very goal.
The Power and Problem of Naming
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The Variable “X”
Perhaps the most accessible exercise of naming’s “re-creative power” is
in Malcolm X’s decision to change his surname from “Little” to the stark
variable “X,” as explained in The Autobiography of Malcolm X through the
speech of Elijah Muhammed: 
Your slavemaster, he brought you over here, and of your past
everything was destroyed. Today, you do not even know your true
language. What tribe are you from? You would not recognize your
tribe’s name if you heard it. You don’t know nothing about your true
culture. You don’t even know your family’s real name. You are
wearing a white man’s name! (Autobiography 258)
In order to protest the erasure of his African ancestors’ names in their
abduction and enslavement, Malcolm quickly adopts and practices the ideas
of Elijah Muhammed by shedding the “white man’s name” and substituting
it with “X”—as did thousands of Black Muslims during this movement. In
re-naming himself as “X,” Malcolm engages in his own act of erasure, x-ing
out his oppressor’s name (whom he collectively calls the “white devils”) in
retaliation for their erasure of his ancestors’ names. Malcolm explains, “For
me, my ‘X’ replaced the white slavemaster name of ‘Little’ which some
blue-eyed devil named Little had imposed upon my paternal forebears. . . .
We would keep this ‘X’ until God Himself returned and gave us a Holy
Name from His own mouth” (Autobiography 203). In this way, “X” un-
names what Hall categorizes as the Presence Europeenne4 located in
cultural identity—that presence which narrates “the black subject” as
exotic, dark, mysterious, hyper-sexual, violent, and all of the “Other”
codifications by which colonial representation expropriates the raced body.
So it is that “X” also marks the spot—the body—as a site of African history,
loss, erasure.
In the meantime, this “X” has become a loaded cultural character—
what Robert Elliot Fox calls “the X-factor,” which now adorns “hats and
other paraphernalia” (17). This literal wearing of a divorced letter proves
that “X” has the emblematic power, Fox argues, to “[mark] the unknown
(‘it’s a black thing—you wouldn’t understand’) at the same time it
proclaims an identity: we are the X-men, blues people, the children of
Malcolm” (17). I’m struck by the suggestion in this line that Malcolm has
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not only managed to evoke his lost lineage with “X,” but to create a new
following, a generation bred out of this protest: the children of Malcolm.
What Malcolm—and earlier, Elijah Muhammed—does not
acknowledge, however, is the near-impossibility of finding out “[his]
family’s real name,” centuries after their enslavement. (To do so would
require, presumably, extensive research and travel to his ancestors’ African
villages, if they even exist anymore.) So Malcolm is indeed right to propose
that only “God Himself” could solve what Fox calls “an algebraic problem”
of which X is “the unknown variable” (17). It’s an equation Malcolm never
solves—or if he does, not by way of his ancestral name; he becomes,
instead, El-Hajj Malik El-Shabazz after his pilgrimage to Mecca. Perhaps
this final re-naming does not represent X’s failure, but rather, the instability
of identity. “I have been always a man who tries to face facts,” he says, “and
to accept the reality of life as new experience and new knowledge unfolds
it. I have always kept an open mind, which is necessary to the flexibility . . .
with every form of intelligent search for truth” (Autobiography 347). 
While “flexibility” carries a somewhat complicit tone, I believe what
Malcolm intuits in this word-choice is the struggle of the Named to
constantly negotiate “the reality of life” (to Hall, “the continuous ‘play’ of
history”) with an already-unstable identity. I hear in his admission not
merely the “acceptance” of these experiences, but the “intelligent” use of
them in the production of his own identity. Re-naming is a proactive part of
this evolution of “becoming,”5 as we see at the end of the autobiography,
when the greatest personal “truth” this search reveals is change—in his
psychology, his philosophy, and in the final paragraphs’ predictions (just
watch and see if I’m not right. . . .)6 Indeed, the man we read at the book’s
end is not merely an older and wiser version of the Malcolm we meet in
Chapter One, though he acknowledges such. More so, the autobiography
charts Malcolm’s constant movement towards something—towards an
identity he re-positions for himself and continues to project into the future.
He thinks aloud about entering law school, learning Chinese and Arabic,
“which [he] think[s] is going to be the most powerful spiritual language of
the future” (Autobiography 387). He bears his thinking on the page for all
to see—no one reads Malcolm better than Malcolm—because, most of all,
he wants to contribute to the world of thought and to have that thought be
respected (388). Indeed, this is a person who knows who he is, who he has
been—and more importantly, who he is becoming. 
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But he contradicts himself all throughout the book, complain some
readers. (And certainly, there are times when Malcolm implicates himself:
“To my own shame, when I say all of this I’m talking first of all about
myself . . .” [57].) I hear in these readers’ complaints the belief that identity
is stable and steadfast, even as it is tested. Malcolm X’s autobiography
speaks a different story, as he admits to Haley, “I’m man enough to tell you
that I can’t put my finger on exactly what my philosophy is now, but I’m
flexible” (436). Malcolm X’s shifting identity becomes a vehicle for the
reader’s awareness of what it means to be open to ideas; for, to think of
identity as fixed or static entraps us in cycles that don’t recognize a need
for change. 
As Alex Haley explains in the autobiography’s epilogue, Malcolm
remained faithful to his experiences and was honest about his ambivalent
feelings toward figures like Cassius Clay, Elijah Muhammed, and the
Nation of Islam in general. Several times Haley worries that Malcolm will
revise his story on account of his “bitter” feelings (419)—and in fact,
Malcolm almost revises some sections. A bit of a power struggle ensues
between Narrator and Writer. “Whose book is this?” he challenges Haley,
implicitly naming himself as the owner of the narrative, with the power to
trump Haley’s role as the writer (Autobiography 421). But Haley wields the
power to coax personal memory from Malcolm X, and ultimately wins the
battle to preserve those uncensored memories (in this case, “his Black
Muslim days”) exactly as Malcolm X narrated them to him. It is Haley,
then, who helps us to know “El-Hajj Malik El-Shabazz, who had been
called Malcolm X; who had been called Malcolm Little; who had been
called ‘Big Red’ and ‘Satan’ and ‘Homeboy’ and other names—who had
been buried as a Moslem” (463). It seems fitting that Haley performs this
chronological roll-call at the book’s end, not as a checking-off of names but
rather, a calling forth, a beckoning of Malcolm X’s spirit inhabited in all of
his names, inhabiting all of his experiences. 
The “Mysterious ‘W’”
“Not all of us, actually only a few, seek to deal with our names in this
manner,” writes Ralph W. Ellison, offering a different perspective from that
of Black Muslims like Malcolm X. “We take what we have and make of
them what we can” (Ellison 149). In his essay, “Hidden Name and
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Complex Fate,” Ellison incites the name of Hemingway “in order to
establish a perspective, a set of assumptions from which [he] may speak.”
It may seem initially problematic that Ellison needs this comparative
standard in order to begin talking about his own personal experiences as a
writer living in the United States. The troubling implication such a
comparison invites is that Ellison’s identity is indeterminate without the
white, popular writer that Hemingway represents—a man Ellison calls “the
master, the culture hero” (145). What does it mean for Ellison’s experiences
to be bound by a “set of assumptions from which [he] may speak,” and
what exactly are these assumptions? 
For Ellison, these assumptions concern the “relationship between
suffering and art” (Ellison 146). There is a certain expectation, he points
out, for a writer of a minority background to deal with “racial hardship” in
his art (145). Ellison right away acknowledges “the validity” of writing
about these struggles, but resists being shackled by them. An all-American
writer like Hemingway, in contrast, is in no way expected to deal with race;
in fact, he can even set his writing abroad, beyond the borders of America,
if he chooses.7 Prefacing his interview with Ralph Ellison, John O’Brien
writes on this point, “Hemingway went to foreign and distant forms of
rituals of violence rather than choosing those of America. Ellison interprets
this as the effort of the American writer to turn from social to personal
concerns as the drama of his fiction” (222). If this is the case for the
“master, our cultural hero,” then the writer of racial minority should also be
allowed to name his “personal concerns”—and not be expected to speak for
the entire community by way of social commentary. Rather, Ellison seeks
to explore the meaning of his individual experiences, which are collectively
“shared” anyway, he argues: “What Negro can escape them?” (Ellison 146)
We do not have a choice in our racial makeup, Ellison reminds us, “but we
do become writers out of an act of will, out of an act of choice. . . . And what
happens thereafter causes all those experiences which occurred before we
began to function as writers to take on a special quality of uniqueness”
(146)—just as Hemingway models for us.
Ellison’s defense of the personal experience is also an argument for
keeping individual surnames (as opposed to assuming a collective “X”), and
“mak[ing] of them what we can” (Ellison 149). That does not mean his
identity isn’t concerned with his African ancestors and the erasure of their
names—“the chasm of historical denial,” he calls it—but that a name should
not have more power over identity than the self does: “For we ourselves are
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our true names, not their epithets! So let us, I say, Make Up Our Faces and
Our Minds!” (149) It’s a powerful statement of self-determinism in the
wake of a system whose “definitions belong to the definers not the defined,”
to quote the character, Schoolteacher, in Toni Morrison’s historical novel,
Beloved. Schoolteacher, charged with management of the plantation,
“Sweet Home,” commits multiple acts of violence against the enslaved men
and Sethe, not all of which are physical; in a lesson taught to his (white)
students, Schoolteacher renames and reclassifies the slaves according to
their “animal characteristics.” Set against this scene, Ellison’s loud
prescription (Make Up Our Faces and Our Minds!) reverberates across a
historical milieu and a language system with its violent baggage in tote.
Like so many of the characters and authors discussed here, he too resists
this violence through acts of self-definition, which he wrestles from the
shackles of his given name while simultaneously choosing to keep it.
We might consider, then, the Presence Americaine within Ellison’s
position. Returning to Hall and the paradigm of presences, this third
“ambiguous” presence (which Hall also terms the “‘New World’”
presence—America, Terra Incognita”) signifies a facet of cultural identity
that recognizes the need for assimilation, not for the sake of blending-in (i.e.
the metaphorical melting pot), but for “heterogeneity and diversity” (Hall
395). Ellison kept his name, but he subverted its power to essentialize his
identity; rather, he’s able to reign in this power and make it work (“make of
them what we can”) to a new effect, “liv[ing] with and through, not despite,
difference,” Hall explains, “by hybridity” (395). Given the complicated
relationship Ellison has to his own name (his father named him after Ralph
Waldo Emerson), it seems understandable that Ellison should feel caught
between the past and the present, between the individual and the
community. To simply x his name out would be to deny his father’s
connection to him (“and his [father’s] love for reading” spoken through his
name); instead, he abbreviates his middle name to read, simply, “W.,” both
asserting himself apart from Emerson, while recognizing the name’s strong
psychic power in evoking a life and love of writing. Ellison’s ambivalence,
then, seems located in the site of this initial, which Ellison calls “the
mysterious ‘W’” (153). According to Benston,
This minor gesture of unnaming was Ellison’s private act of
naming—and its essentially ceremonial and symbolic nature, its
turning from both literal and literary (“remote”) paternities,
could not utterly liberate him from the impinging “fusions of
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blood”: “I could suppress the name of my namesake out of
respect for the achievements of its original bearer but I cannot
escape the obligation to achieve some of the things he asked of
the American writer.” (Ellison, qtd. in Benston 6)
The “Cheiropolidi” and Double-Consciousness
I have sought a common denominator in both Ellison and Malcolm X’s
treatment of their names, but make no mistake, “W” is not to Ellison as “X”
is to Malcolm. Ellison does not wish to change his name, but to “charge” it
with personal meaning: Make of [it] what [you] can (149). X-ing it out will
not solve the problem, he seems to argue, echoing a similar attitude as
W.E.B. Du Bois displayed regarding the label “Negro.”
In 1928, Du Bois replied to a young man named Roland Barton “who
wrote a brief letter expressing his support of efforts within the black
American community aimed at eradicating the term Negro,” Gina
Philogène explains in From Black to African American: A New Social
Representation (76). Du Bois’ response to Barton deserves quoting at
length, for his message does not discount the power of naming—as some of
Du Bois’ critics seem to imply—but rather, the futility of a name-change to
yield results that only real action could; in other words, re-naming is no
substitute for action. Du Bois writes,
Suppose now we could change name. Suppose we arose tomorrow
morning and lo! Instead of being “Negroes,” all the world called us
“Cheiropolidi”—Do you really think this would make a vast and
momentous difference to you and to me? Would the Negro problem
be suddenly and eternally settled? Would you be any less ashamed of
being descended from a black man, or would your schoolmates feel
any less superior to you? The feeling of inferiority is in you, not in
any name. The name merely evokes what is already there . . . a Negro
by any other name will be just as black and just as white; just as
ashamed of himself and just as shamed by others, as today. It is not
the name—it’s the Thing that counts. (qtd. in Philogène 76)
Many have answered Du Bois’ response by attacking him for “miss[ing] the
point,” as Obiagele Lake claims in Blue Veins and Kinky Hair: Naming and
Color Consciousness in African America. Lake’s retort is that the objective
behind re-naming is not “to render [African Americans] less despicable to
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European Americans,” but to restore “group cohesion and collective
consciousness” (8). That is, the name change is not aimed at revising how
others see African Americans, but how African Americans see themselves.
But are the two viewpoints so easily distinguished? The point Lake misses,
in turn, is Du Bois’ idea of “double consciousness”—“this sense of always
looking at one’s self through the eye of others, of measuring one’s soul by
the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity” (Du Bois
496). In other words, African Americans have always known how whites
see them. Indeed, this dual awareness, this fraught identity, remains a
tension that is suggested by the label “African American” itself, at the heart
of which still lingers the question, Can you be an African American and an
American at the same time? Du Bois reasons that “the American Negro”
does not wish to “Africanize America” any more than he wants to “bleach”
Africa, arguing that both cultures have something to teach the other; “He
simply wishes to make it possible for a man to be both a Negro and an
American, without being cursed and spit upon by his fellows” (Du Bois
496). In fact, not only did Du Bois not want to “bleach” Africa, he
supported the independence of African nations from colonial control and
the unification of all black African descendants vis à vis the philosophy of
Pan-Africanism, which he helped to form. Du Bois endorsed the philosophy
“as a defense against what he called the ‘logic of the modern colonial
system’ that fueled the global aims of European imperialism,” explains Ross
Posnock in “How it Feels to Be a Problem: Du Bois, Fanon, and the
‘Impossible Life’ of the Black Intellectual” (328). (Posnock names Du Bois
a student of Hegel, among others, for his “romantic racialism.”) The point
here is that Du Bois considers “African American” to be Pan-Africanist in
its politics, for its utterance invokes both the Continent (African) and its
Diaspora (American). But can language—an already-shaky ground where
meaning slips and slides and is always deferred8—withstand the weight of
such a bridge? At what point does the structure collapse? With this rift in
mind, I move on to the fictional characters of Bernard Malamud’s short
story, “The Lady of the Lake.” 
The Universal Jew
The “X-Factor” and the power to re-name and reclaim identity are at the
forefront of this discussion, but what about re-naming as it is used to hide
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racial identity? That is, what happens when naming becomes an act not of
protest, but of assimilation, as it does in Malamud’s “The Lady of the
Lake”? Here, renaming is an act of passing. According to Sophia Lehmann,
in her essay, “In Search of a Mother Tongue,” the effort to assimilate is often
counter-productive, as “it tends to exacerbate rather than alleviate the sense
of marginality for which it was supposed to be the cure” (103). What
Lehmann calls “marginality” might, in fact, be closer to liminality, in that
re/un/naming suspends the person between two identities in order to “pass”
between them, signaling a state of becoming while at the same time “being”
neither. “The Lady of the Lake” is a rich example of this “paradox,” as
Lehmann calls it.9 In this story, the main character changes his name from
Henry Levin—a recognizable Jewish surname—to Henry R. Freeman in
order to blend in and shed the “limitations” his Jewish identity imposes on
him. The name Freeman signifies this liberation for Henry; he wants so
badly to be a “free man,” free of his past, free of memories that represent an
unnamed pain in the story. Because this pain goes unqualified, it thus
becomes universal: it is every Jew’s pain in the face of anti-Semitism.
Malamud knows that this strife needs no explanation; it is enough to say
that Henry is “tired of the past,” because the reader presumably knows what
this past represents for Henry and all Jews living in a post-Holocaust era.
With this new name, and a new beginning in a new place, Henry believes
his hopes and dreams have a better chance of being realized. 
As a counter-point, not every Jew felt compelled to re-name; in fact,
many held onto their names as an act of defiance against anti-Semitism.
Whether to pass or to protest, to fit in or to flex, both are postures of
power wielded in a name. That said, however, the ability to pass is of
greater concern here—especially to the person of color denied that
license—and stands to be “troubled” more than the decision to stand
behind a Jewish name. 
Returning to Malamud’s story, the question of whether or not one can
truly be “free from the past” is implicitly answered at the end. (Malamud’s
stories are known for having a “moral-to-the-story” quality—it is no
different with “Lady of the Lake.”) Initially, Henry argues to himself that “a
memory was only a memory—you could forget, not change it” (Malamud
109). If names are imbued with memory—and much of the scholarship
utilized in this paper suggests so, as well as in Morrison’s Beloved—then
un-naming is not only a kind of cultural forgetting (as opposed to
[re]naming as a site of re-memory, as Beloved proposes), but also a form of
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historical rewriting, inscribing history with new identity and inscribing
identity with new history/-ies. This attitude poses a sharp contrast to those
adopted by Malcolm X, who changes his name in order to remember what
was forgotten, cleaving a lost past with a future—as well as to Ralph W.
Ellison, who keeps his name but reifies its meaning. (We are our names . . .).
Henry, on the other hand, sheds his name like one would a heavy, wet
garment. And he can do so in his mind because “he did not look Jewish,
could pass as not—had. So without batting an eyelash, he said [to the girl],
no, he wasn’t [Jewish]” (Malamud 100). 
Henry therefore hides behind his newly constructed identity. Of course,
the story’s greatest irony is that this re-naming is the real “limitation” to
Henry’s freedom, as it keeps him from being with the woman he falls in
love with: Isabella della Seta, a Jew herself, though Henry doesn’t find out
until it’s too late. His renounced identity secures him the lonely status he
sought to change in the first place. All that he has left at the end,
significantly, is Isabella’s name: “Still calling her name, Freeman embraced
only moonlit stone” (Malamud 114). “Moonlit stone” is an apt description,
for moonlight is intangible—like Isabella—yet pervasive, all-
encompassing. The reader knows that Isabella’s name will continue to
follow him, haunt him; she will become one more “memory” he will try to
“forget,” unsuccessfully. In this way, she is a statue, memorialized in his
mind like “stone,” a dead weight that suggests, in the end, that Henry is not
“free” at all; he runs directly into himself and the identity he worked so hard
to “forget.”
At this point, it is important to acknowledge that hiding one’s Jewish
identity was necessary for survival during the Nazi occupation. Indeed,
hiding/passing is at the other end of this discussion on the re-positioning
possibilities in renaming. There is no greater stake in renaming than mere
survival, when “forgetting and isolation, the circumstances which both the
Nazis and the colonizers tried to enforce,” Lehmann adds, “become self-
imposed” (102). This was true also for fifteenth-century Jews who feigned
conversion to the Christian church in order to escape persecution, as
Michelle Cliff recalls in The Land of Look Behind. “It was never a question
of passing,” Cliff writes. “It was a question of hiding. . . . I would be
whatever figure these foreign imaginations cared for me to be. It would be
so simple to let others fill in for me” (qtd. in Lehmann 102).10 The
distinction between passing and hiding is duly noted. The first connotes a
choice; the second, a condition for existence. Even hiding was no guarantee
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for survival with the risk of being recognized and “called out,” so to speak.
In this context, it is hard to imagine a greater anxiety posited in naming and
being named (albeit a different instability from that which we’ve considered
so far, of identity as a production, a becoming).
Is it no wonder, then, that a denial of naming is exactly what makes
naming a radical speech act in both post-Holocaust and post-Slavery
literature, in which bearing witness and remembering—running themes in
both genres—are the most powerful possibilities language imparts? (Typing
the keywords “bearing witness” into Amazon.com’s search engine will
immediately yield two results that demonstrate this point: Henry Louis
Gates’ anthology, Bearing Witness: Selections from African-American
Autobiography in the Twentieth Century, and Hazel Rochman’s collection,
Bearing Witness: Stories of the Holocaust.) Malamud’s character, Isabella,
is both a witness and a mouthpiece for this message, as she bears the mark
of oppression—the numbered tattoo, yet another erasure of names not
unlike the one slavery committed. After revealing her true identity to Henry,
she says, “The past is meaningful to me. I treasure what I suffered for”
(Malamud 114). It is indeed a powerful declaration of identity, but it could
be said that she, too, tries escaping her past—or at least circumventing it in
her desire to realize her dream of going to America—in her appropriation
of the name “del Dongo” and the aristocracy it represents. Here again,
remembering and/or forgetting the past is inextricably linked to this idea of
naming and re-naming. “My name is not del Dongo,” she confesses. “It is
Isabella della Seta” (112). Ultimately, Isabella’s history trumps her dreams
for the future, as she cannot perpetuate the fraud any longer. 
Bearing witness and the notion of collective memory, as Eric Sundquist
takes up in Strangers in the Land, poses an interesting “paradox” (just as
Lehmann would call assimilation). Quoting Gerald Early, Sundquist
reminds us that collective memory can be a double bind as much as it can
be a bond: “African Americans are ‘bound by the prison of self-
consciousness about the meaning of their once having been African, while
realizing that they can never be African again’” (265, emphasis mine).
Sundquist places Early’s quotation alongside a discussion of William
Melvin Kelley’s essay, “The Ivy League Negro,” which argues that unlike
other immigrant groups, it’s problematic for African Americans to be united
by a collective memory (“of African identity”) because such a
“consciousness” is dependent upon slavery to help form it. This, Sundquist
says, is “the paradox” (265). 
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Putting this argument aside and returning to Du Bois’ ideas for a
moment, the problems of double consciousness—the strife of being both
American and Jewish—is resolved for Henry in his suppressing the latter
identity and naming himself solely “American.” But Henry remains anxious
and always aware of this strife, nonetheless; he is constantly wondering
what others think of him, how they see him: “He was embarrassedly aware
of the boy and Ernesto . . . openly staring at him” (Malamud 104); “He
swam awkwardly, hating the picture he must make in her eyes” (108).
Fueling this self-consciousness, of course, is the fear of being recognized;
“the worry that troubled him the most was the lie he had told her, that he
wasn’t a Jew” (109). Henry remains paranoid whereas the others discussed
up until this point—Malcolm X, Ellison, even Isabella—are working
towards a realization and revelation of identity, despite its instability. They
inhabit and “own” their identities, while Henry disowns his—and yet seems
at the mercy of it; he hopes desperately that a change of name and place will
turn his experiences in life around. 
In fresh territory and a foreign language, Henry makes a poor guide for
himself—to the sights, to Isabella’s front door, to the meaning of his own
thoughts and identity. He can’t even make a simple phone call without
worrying first “if the maid or somebody answered the phone first, [in which
case] he would have a ridiculous time identifying himself; so he settled for
sending her a note” (Malamud 102). Time and again, language and naming
fail Henry. He tries desperately to imagine how Isabella sees him—and how
that might change if she were to see him as a Jew. In the process, he couldn’t
be more wrong about her—though on some level, he seems to see and
recognize her Jewish identity, with her “long and thin” nose, and “in her
eyes a hidden hunger, or memory thereof” (100). But because Henry so
often has trouble putting into words what it is he is feeling—“Just why, he
couldn’t exactly tell, but he could tell yes, had seen in her eyes” (101)—he
cannot name what it is he recognizes about Isabella. He constantly fumbles
for the right words to name his feelings; language fails him (a prominent
theme in post-Holocaust literature). So it seems that along with the identity
he’s suppressed, he’s lost the ability to identify others.
Xavier Review
44
Conclusion: The Shift to Listen
Identity, then, comes closest to being known through shared experience
than it does in an individual name. The Autobiography of Malcolm X and
Malamud’s stories exemplify a literature that gives us access to these
experiences, and thus continue to be an important means to understanding
identity. Following Malcolm’s lead, my own “flexible” thinking on “X”
now is that it functions more as a verb than proper noun—not as an x-ing
out, but in a scoring together (in this case, Jews and blacks). As Fox reminds
us, the letter itself is a crossing, “the intersection of the material and the
spiritual,” and I would add, of the past and the present (17). This idea of
crossing—not of crossing out, but cross-stitching—is perhaps the
reconciliation the shifting name seeks for both of these ethnic groups. 
“Language is a place of struggle,” says Adam McKible in “These Are
the Facts of the Darky’s History.” As the characters and figures mentioned
here wrestle with their names, they also wrestle with the context in which
they have been spoken. Choosing other names or choosing to remain with
these names thus becomes a conscious act of defining one’s personal
identity within the context of the overarching cultural, racial identities—
what bell hooks calls “the Oppressed struggle in language to recover our-
selves—to rewrite, to reconcile, to renew” (qtd. in McKible 223).
So many r- words have surfaced in my research for this paper—namely,
resistance and reconciliation. I do not know if any reconciliation for Jews
and African Americans came out of (re)naming; I only know that there is
still important work to be done with this discussion, and that we must enter
the conversation ready to listen as much as we speak. This truth became
increasingly known to me during the writing of this paper, when comically,
I would periodically turn on the television and hear Oprah addressing the
very concerns I was writing about. I listened as those women honored at
Oprah’s “Legends Ball” were named one by one, and found myself getting
emotional at the sound of their names. A day or two later, I would tune in
to Oprah, only to find her walking around Auschwitz with Elie Wiesel, arm
in arm, who periodically leaned in and whispered, “Oprah . . . you cannot
imagine. Oprah. There are no words. . . .”
Sometimes what we hear the loudest is silence—which is not a
shutting-down of conversation, but a paradoxical reverberation of all that
cannot be said. Experience of this magnitude defies language, Wiesel
implies. Nonetheless, we grasp for words; we try to name experience—a
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struggle located in the very name, Yahweh, which means “namelessness, or
that which cannot be named” (Benston 4). Indeed, “we must keep in mind
the roots of the phenomenon here termed ‘unnaming’ . . . lie deep within
Greek and Hebraic traditions,” Benston reminds us. “The refusal to be
named invokes the power of the Sublime, [and is] a transcendent impulse to
undo all categories . . .” (4).
But naming can be a productive power, too, as I said early on—it’s “a
creative direction of the life force” (10). That is, in naming we create. And
so we must be very careful in how we wield this power, literature teaches
us, so that naming doesn’t become destructive. And perhaps most of all, in
our “intelligent search[es] for truth” (Autobiography 347), in our quests to
re-name and re-create ourselves, to revise ethnic labels and rid ourselves of
racial epithets, we must not get lost amidst those changes, sacrificing the
very identities our names seek.
Works Cited
The Autobiography of Malcolm X (As Told to Alex Haley). New York:
Ballantine, 1964.
Benston, Kimberly W. “‘I Yam What I Am’: Naming and Unnaming in Afro-
American Literature.” Black American Literature Forum 16 (1982): 3-11.
Clifton, Lucille. “at the cemetery, walnut grove plantation, south carolina, 1989.”
Contemporary American Poetry. 7th ed. Ed. A. Poulin, Jr. and Michael
Waters. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2001. 85.
Du Bois, W.E.B. The Souls of Black Folks. Rpt. in Black Voices: Anthology of
African-American Literature. Ed. Abraham Chapman. New York: Signet
Classic, 1968. 494-510.
Ellison, Ralph W. “Hidden Name and Complex Fate: A Writer’s Experience in the
United States.” Shadow and Act. New York: Random House, 1953. 144-166.
___. Interview with John O’Brien. Conversations with Ralph Ellison. Ed.
Maryemma Graham and Amritjit Singh. Jackson: UP of Mississippi,
1995. 222-234.
Fox, Robert Elliot. “Afrocentrism and the X-Factor.” Transition 57 (1992): 17-25.
Hall, Stuart. “Cultural Identity and Diaspora.” Colonial Discourse and Post-
Colonial Theory: A Reader. Eds. Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman. New
York: Columbia UP, 1994. 392-403.
King, Debra Walker. Deep Talk: Reading African-American Literary Names.
Charlottesville, VA: UP of Virginia, 1998.
Xavier Review
46
Lake, Obiagele. Blue Veins and Kinky Hair: Naming and Color Consciousness in
African America. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003.
Lehmann, Sophia. “In Search of a Mother Tongue: Locating Home in Diaspora.”
MELUS 23 (1998): 101-118.
Malamud, Bernard . “The Lady of the Lake.” Rpt. in American Jewish Fiction.
Lincoln, NE: U of Nebraska P, 1998. 94-114.
McKible, Adam. “‘These Are the Facts of the Darky’s History’: Thinking History
and Reading Names in Four African American Texts.” African American
Review 28 (1994): 223-235.
Morrison, Toni. Beloved: A Novel. New York: Knopf, 1987.
Philogène, Gina. From Black to African American: A New Social Representation.
Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999.
Posnock, Ross. “How It Feels to Be a Problem: Du Bois, Fanon, and the ‘Impossible
Life’ of the Black Intellectual.” Critical Inquiry 23 (1997): 323-349.
“A Special Presentation: Oprah and Elie Wiesel at the Auschwitz Death Camp.“
The Oprah Winfrey Show. CBS. WBNS, Columbus, OH. 24 May 2006. 
Sundquist, Eric. Strangers in the Land: Blacks, Jews, Post-Holocaust America.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2005.
Notes
1 The poem was written for the special occasion of Oprah’s Legends Weekend, a
“once in a lifetime” event on May 13-15, 2005 that honored the achievements of
African-American women—the “Legends”—whose ranks include Anna Deavere
Smith and Maya Angelou. (Oprah also has a separate category for “Young’uns”
whose talent she also honored—mostly that of actresses and singers.) That Oprah
both recognizes and harnesses the power to “name” these women, as performed
by Cleage’s poem, is of added interest to the scope of this paper.
2 Another consideration of this topic is the problematic power of ethnic labels and
racial epithets—further locations of anxiety, I argue, for both the named and the
one doing the naming. By this I mean racial epithets (such as “Darky”) that
contain deep-seated anxiety regarding whiteness and its own unstable
superiority, as argued by Gwendolyn Audrey Foster in “Performing Whiteness.”
3 It should be noted that Hall is using “the diaspora experience” metaphorically to
mean those “identities which are constantly producing and reproducing
themselves anew, through transformation and difference,” as opposed to the
literal meaning (of “scattered tribes whose identity can only be secured in
relation to some sacred homeland”), which Hall finds imperialistic and
hegemonic (235).
4 A schema Hall borrows from Aimee Cesaire and Leopold Senghor in which three
presences within the diasporic identity are pulled apart and discussed at length:
the repressed Presence Africaine, the ambivalent Presence Europeenne, and the
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ambiguous Presence Americain—connecting each one to erasure, appropriation,
and assimilation, respectively. I include Hall’s adjectives to give the reader a
quick sense of how he’s using them in “rethinking” cultural identity.
5 Becoming is to Hall what Being is to Heidegger. The word carries considerable
importance to his central argument that cultural identity is a production, a
perpetual process “of ‘becoming’ as well as of ‘being.’ It belongs to the future as
much as to the past,” he states (395).
6 Unfortunately, his predictions also prove true; he’s assassinated for his “role” in
social change and soon thereafter maligned by the white press as “a symbol of
‘hatred’” (Autobiography 389). 
7 Analogously, consider the difference in these two clauses: To tell a writer that he
must write versus to tell a writer what he must write. The difference is subtle—
one consonant—but it changes the meaning significantly. The first grants
Hemingway the simple freedom to write. The second, however, holds Ellison to
the rubric of writing about race, implicating the creed, the personal is the
political.
8 Even Hall looks to Derrida on this point: “Where, then, does Identity come in to
this infinite postponement of meaning?” he asks. Hall answers his question with
an important distinction: Postponement does not imply an absence or
impossibility of meaning—which would threaten his own ideas on “positioning
and repositioning” identity in order to arrive at new meaning—but rather,
“meaning continues to unfold” so that it’s possible, even necessary, to keep
rethinking meaning in all its “excess or supplement[s].” The problem, then, is
that there’s too much meaning; “there is always something ‘left over’” (395).
9 Lehmann notes, too, that “The Lady of the Lake” is a re-naming of the popular
Arthurian legend. Malamud posits Judaism in the English literary canon,
changing the legend in a way that “creates the mythic Lady of the Lake as a
contemporary Jew,” writes Lehmann. “In doing so, [Malamud emphasizes] the
contrast between Arthur, who proudly comes into his identity as he is given the
Excalibur by the Lady of the Lake, and Levin, who is left empty-handed and
alone” (Lehmann 113).
10 As a side-interest, contemporary nonfiction has seen a rise in fabricated
Holocaust memoirs—such as Fragments, written by Bruno Grosjean Dossekker
(a.k.a Binjamin Wilkomirski), who assumes the identity of a Jewish man
remembering his internment in the concentration camps when he was a child.
Fragments, found to be fraudulent after its release in 1995, became the subject of
Stefan Maechler’s 2001 book, The Wilkomirski Affair: A Study in Biographical
Truth and continues to raise questions about our strong reception of Holocaust
literature—and our equally, if not stronger, reaction towards appropriations of
personal and collective history/-ies. The latter tendency forms a troubling tangent
to the cited theories here on “re-thinking” or “re-positioning” cultural identity,
and especially to that of collective consciousness.
